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The Role of Sponsor and External Management on the Capital 
Structure of Asian-Pacific REITs: The Case of Australia, Japan, 
and Singapore  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies how the presence of sponsor and external management affect 
leverage and debt maturity decisions in three major Asian-Pacific REIT markets: 
Australia, Japan and Singapore. Our empirical results indicate that sponsored 
REITs opt for higher levels of leverage and loans with longer maturity. On the 
contrary, externally managed REITs are associated with lower leverage and loans 
with shorter maturity. Our results are robust to the inclusion of other firm variables 
and to alternative specifications. Subsequent to the financial crisis, the impact of 
sponsorship on debt financing decisions has diminished, and borrowing of 
externally managed REITs is further constrained.  
 
Keywords: Asian-Pacific REIT markets, capital structure, debt maturity, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the Asian-Pacific REIT markets have experienced tremendous 
growth in terms of the number of REITs as well as their market valuation. As of January 2014, 
the largest REIT market in the region is Australia, followed by Japan and Singapore. Together, 
these three REIT markets include 98 publicly-listed REITs with a combined market 
capitalization of US$202.6 billion.1 The recent establishment of the REIT structure and the 
flourishing REIT equity market in the Asian-Pacific region has sparked interest from 
practitioners and academics to better understand these Asian-Pacific REITs. Given that the 
Asian-Pacific equity markets are relatively young and these REITs are known to pursue 
aggressive acquisition strategies (Ooi et al. 2011), one vital puzzle is how these REITs can 
sustain their growth through financing. This is especially important for entities such as REITs 
because they are characterized by high dividend distribution which limits their abilities to use 
internal fund to satisfy their capital needs, and are consequently heavily reliant on long-term debt 
financing for property acquisition (Ott et al. 2005).  
Prior research on financing and capital structure decisions of REITs focuses 
predominantly on the U.S. market (e.g., Howe and Shilling 1988; Capozza and Seguin 2000; 
Brown and Riddiough 2003; Feng et al. 2007; Boudry et al. 2010). For instance, Howe and 
Shilling (1988) examine the tax-exempt status of U.S. REITs and argue firms should use little or 
no debt in their capital structure. Capozza and Seguin (2000) find that cost of debt and equity are 
higher for more diversified REITs. Brown and Riddiough (2003) find that REITs’ financing 
choice depends on their pre-existing corporate structures, in which firms with higher existing 
                                                            
1  For comparison purpose, the U.S. REIT market has currently a total of 166 firms and a combined market 
capitalization of US$683 billion (Source: SNL Database). 
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debt (equity) issuing equity (debt) in subsequent offering. They also show that REITs target a 
long-run leverage ratio with the objective of maintaining an investment grade rating. Feng et al. 
(2007) show that REITs with historically high market-to-book ratios tend to have persistently 
high leverage ratios, and they attribute the findings to the existence of the special regulatory 
environment of U.S. REITs, with limited tax-shield benefits on debt interest payments given 
their tax-exempt status. Boudry et al. (2010) show that REITs are less likely to issue debt when 
bankruptcy costs are high and interpret this finding as support of the trade-off theory (e.g., Kraus 
and Litzenberger 1973), in which the benefits of debt are offset by the risk and cost of debt.  
Several other studies switch their focuses from the U.S. REIT market and examine capital 
structure decisions in other listed real estate companies. Ooi (1999b) find that asset structure (i.e., 
proportion of non-monetary real estate assets within firms) and the level of involvement in 
property development are important determinants of corporate debt policy in U.K. property 
companies. Bond and Scott (2006) show that when U.K. real estate firms turn to external 
financing, debt constitutes the majority of securities issued. This confirms with the pecking order 
theory (e.g., Majluf and Myers 1984) in which firms would prefer debt to equity as debt issuance 
has a small negative impact on stock price. Examining stock price reactions of equity and debt 
offerings for a sample of European property companies, Brounen and Eichholtz (2001) document 
significant negative price reactions with equity offering, and variations in stock reaction are 
related to size of the issue, pre-offer leverage, underlying property types as well as operating 
performance.  
Leland and Toft (1996) argue that capital structure is not a standalone choice and optimal 
leverage is a function of a firm’s risk as well as its debt maturity. Giambona et al. (2008) and 
Alcock et al. (2014) highlight the importance of the multidimensionality of capital structure 
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choices in the real estate industry 2  noting that, when REITs issue debt, a crucial and 
simultaneous decision is to determine the maturity term of the debt contracts. Research in debt 
maturity choices has found some determinants for maturity in REIT debts. For example, Ooi 
(1999a) suggests a weak relationship between long-term debt issuance and macroeconomic 
factors such as interest rate movements. Highfield et al. (2007) find that firms with higher 
growth issue shorter maturity debts, but find no evidence of future operating performance 
affecting debt maturity. Nagano (2010) examines J-REITs and shows that REITs which invest in 
more liquid property types are able to issue longer-term debts. Ghosh et al. (2011), using 
simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity, examine various corporate governance 
mechanisms (such as entrenchment and board effectiveness) on the capital structure of REITs. 
Their findings suggest that entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debts.  
Our research objective in this study is to examine capital structure decision making, on 
leverage and maturity, in the Asian-Pacific REIT markets. In particular, we are interested in how 
the characteristics of these Asian-Pacific REITs differ from their U.S. / European counterparts 
and how these differences could affect capital structure choices. Prior research (e.g., Ooi et al. 
2006; Wong et al. 2013; Lecomte and Ooi 2013) show that Asian-Pacific REITs have several 
unique features that are substantially different from REITs in other regions, in particular the U.S. 
3 We conjecture two factors that could have a significant impact on leverage and maturity of 
Asian-Pacific REITs: the presence of sponsors and the management structure of REITs.  
                                                            
2 Studies such as Barclay et al. (2003) and Johnson (2003) have examined the simultaneity of leverage and debt 
maturity decision in other industrial firms.  
3 Recently, Packer et al. (2014) provide a global overview of the REIT market worldwide. 
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Some previous studies inspire us to consider the presence of a sponsor to be an important 
factor on the capital structure determination in Asian-Pacific REITs. A publication by the CFA 
Institute (2011) highlights the sponsor plays a central role in many Asian-Pacific REIT markets. 
In its simplest form, a REIT sponsor is usually a large real estate company with investment in a 
REIT and maintains significant control over the REIT manager.4 It also tends to be the entity that 
sources the properties placed into the REIT at the time of IPO. Extant finance literature (e.g., 
Barry et al. 1990; Megginson and Weiss 1991) argue that reputable sponsors provide quality 
certification which reduces information asymmetry in the IPO market. Recently, Wong et al. 
(2013) test whether sponsors in Asian REIT IPOs alleviate moral hazard concerns. They find a 
positive and significant bi-directional relationship between the fraction of shares held by the 
sponsor in IPO and the level of underpricing, implying the presence of a sponsor indicates to the 
market that the REIT has the support and guidance of an experienced market participant. Hence, 
we suppose the debt market would favor lending to a REIT with sponsor as their credit risks can 
be partially offset by sponsor support. We predict that Asia-Pacific REITs with sponsors raise 
higher leverage and they are able to issue debts with longer maturity. 
We also believe that the management structure of the Asia-Pacific REITs may be 
important for the corresponding capital structure. First, notice that while the U.S. REIT market 
has mostly transitioned from externally managed to internally managed REITs (Ambrose and 
Linneman 2001), REITs in the Asian-Pacific region are essentially externally managed (EPRA 
2008). The preference for an external management model in the Asian-Pacific REIT markets is a 
combination of history and precedent at the time of their formation, when Japanese and 
Singaporean REITs were modelled after the Australian market that was predominantly externally 
                                                            
4 The REIT manager can be an external third party in an externally managed REIT, or an internal manager in an 
internally managed REIT. 
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managed at that time following the early U.S. model (APREA 2014). An externally managed 
REIT requires an appointment of an external party, usually another real estate corporation, 
responsible for managing the assets owned by the REIT. This external party acts as a manager of 
these REIT properties and has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of REIT shareholders. 
On the other hand, an internally managed REIT employs its own staff to manage its own assets 
and operate similar to a normal C-corporation. Prior research (e.g., Capozza and Seguin 2000) 
document the underperformance of externally managed REITs in the U.S. market in the 1990s, 
highlighting the agency problems created by the externally managed REIT organization structure 
and arguing external parties may use their control to extract value from the REIT entities to the 
detriment of REIT shareholders.  Based on the U.S. data, . Cannon and Vogt (1995) show that 
externally managed REITs are less levered as compared to internally managed firms. As debt 
financing is typically cheaper than equity financing, the authors interpret their findings as 
evidence of an externally managed structure having sub-optimal returns due to the conflicts of 
interest between the REIT shareholders and the external advisors. Following similar reasoning, 
we conjecture that externally managed Asian-Pacific REITs are less likely to engage in debt 
financing. Moreover, these externally advisors are less likely to help the REITs to secure debts 
with longer maturity that minimize liquidity and refinancing risks. 
Our empirical analysis utilizes REIT data from Australia, Japan and Singapore over the 
sample period of 2005-2011. We focus on these three Asian-Pacific markets because they are the 
largest REIT markets in the region and at present, data on other markets are relatively sparse. 
Our findings indicate that our two key variables, Sponsor and External Management, 
significantly affect both leverage and debt maturity. We show that sponsored REITs opt for 
higher levels of leverage and loans with longer maturity. On the contrary, externally managed 
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REITs are associated with lower leverage and they pursue loans of shorter maturity. Our results 
are robust to the inclusion of other firm variables that influence debt decisions of Asian-Pacific 
REITs, and to alternative specifications which we model leverage and debt maturity as 
simultaneous decisions (Giambona et al. 2008; Ghosh et al. 2011; Alcock et al. 2014).  
Given that our sample period is coincidental with the recent global financial crisis, we 
conduct further analysis to examine the impact of financial crisis on the relationship between 
debt financing and sponsorship and management structure. We show that, subsequent to the 
financial crisis, the impact of sponsorship on debt financing decisions has diminished while 
borrowing of externally managed REITs is substantially constrained. Overall, our evidence 
support the view that external management is detrimental to debt financing as external advisory 
may opt for higher-cost equity financing at the expense of REIT shareholders, and the presence 
of sponsor serves as a signal of quality that reduces information asymmetry between REIT 
management and debt holders allowing for more debt funding with longer repayment terms.   
Our study contributes to extant real estate research in the following ways. First, we 
extend the literature on Asian-Pacific REITs. As the market is relatively young and only a short 
time series of data are available, there is limited empirical research on Asian-Pacific REITs (e.g., 
Ooi et al. 2006; Ooi et al. 2011; Wong et al. 2013; Lecomte and Ooi 2013). We focus on the 
distinctive features of these firms to examine how the presence of sponsors and external 
management affect their corporate financing decisions. Second, we add to the REIT literature on 
capital structure by identifying factors that influence debt decisions for Asian-Pacific REITs. We 
show that, in the context of Asian-Pacific REITs, there are additional factors one should consider 
when analyzing capital structure decision making. Third, with the development of REITs 
currently underway in other major Asian markets such as China and India, our study bears 
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foremost policy implications to firms in these new markets. We show that, despite the popularity 
of the external managed REIT structure in the region, principal-agent conflicts may prompt these 
REITs to behave differently in financing decision making.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the research 
design and depicts our empirical methodology. Section three describes the sample selection 
process and shows summary statistics of the sample. We present, in section four, the empirical 
results. Finally, the last section offers some concluding remarks.  
 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our objective is to examine the impact of sponsorship and external management on the 
level of leverage and debt maturity in Asian-Pacific REITs. We follow the framework of Ghosh 
et al. (2011) but include two additional variables to proxy for the presence of sponsor and 
external management.  Our model specifications are depicted as follows: 
Leverage = β0 + β1 Sponsor + β2 External Management + β3 Controls   (1) 
Debt Maturity = β0 + β1 Sponsor + β2 External Management + β3 Controls (2) 
where Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets (e.g., Alcock et al. 2014), and 
Debt Maturity is the weighted average maturity of all debts in a REIT (e.g., Ghosh et al. 2011).5 
Sponsor is a dummy variable equal to one (zero otherwise) if the REIT has a sponsor. To 
determine whether a REIT has a sponsor, we need a REIT to satisfy two criteria. First, we 
                                                            
5 We follow similar approach as in Ghosh et al. (2011) and calculate the weighted average maturity multiplying the 
percentage of debts maturing in each time horizon for each REIT reported in the SNL database (i.e., within 12 
months, 1-6 years, more than 6 years) by the midpoint of the categories in within 12 months (i.e., 0.5 year) and 1-6 
years (i.e., 3.5 years). For debts maturing in more than 6 years, we use a factor of 6. We argue the measure of 
maturity in Ghosh et al. (2011) make better use of the firm’s whole maturity structure.  
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measure the shareholdings of the top five shareholders6 and consider a firm as having a sponsor 
if shareholdings of these top investors are more than 10% because a sponsor should have 
substantial financial stake in the company. Another requirement of sponsor is that it should have 
significant involvement in the company. Hence, we verify whether these investors have 
involvement by manually reviewing the prospectus and annual reports of each REIT. We expect 
REITs with sponsor have higher levels of leverage and longer maturity debts, and thus positive 
coefficients for β1. External Management is a dummy variable with value one (zero otherwise) if 
the REIT is externally managed. We expect externally managed REITs have lower levels of 
leverage and shorter maturity debts, and thus negative coefficients for β2. 
 We include a set of control variables traditionally used in the literature to explain 
leverage and debt maturity.  Following Ghosh et al. (2011), we include different sets of controls 
for leverage and debt maturity, and these are the same set of control variables as reported in 
Table 1 of Ghosh et al. (2011). In model specification (1), we include Market-to-Book, Firm 
Size, Profitability (ROA), Cash Flow Volatility, Market Access, Asset Liquidity and Firm Age. In 
model specification (2), we include Market-to-Book, Firm Size, Firm Size Squared, Cash Flow 
Volatility, Earnings Growth, Market Access, Asset Liquidity, Asset Maturity and Firm Age. 
Market-to-Book is measured as total assets minus book equity plus market equity and then 
divided by total assets, and is used as a proxy for firms’ growth opportunities. Myers (1977) and 
Hart and Moore (1995) show that firms with growth opportunities would underinvest if the 
benefits go partially to debt holders. Alternatively, growth firms could be more reliant on debt 
financing to sustain their growth. Hence, we offer no directional prediction on the variable. We 
include Firm Size, the natural logarithm of the book values of total assets. Johnson (2003) and 
                                                            
6 We also include any ownership termed “Strategic Entities” from Thomson One.  
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Stohs and Mauer (1996) use this variable to signal firm quality, and we expect it to be positively 
related to leverage and to debt maturity. We also include Firm Size Squared to control for non-
linearity in debt maturity (Diamond 1991a) and expect a negative coefficient. Myers (1984) 
shows firms with higher profitability would prefer to use internal funds to debt financing; hence 
we include Profitability (ROA), an accounting measure of return-on-assets (net income divided 
by book values of total assets), as a determinant of leverage and expect a negative coefficient. 
Cash Flow Volatility, time-series standard deviation of cash flows from operations, signifies the 
inherent risks in the firm’s cash flows. We expect higher risks constrain the financing ability of 
firms, and therefore negative impact on leverage and debt maturity. Earnings Growth is a proxy 
for influences of asymmetric information on a firm’s capital structure and we measure it by the 
forward-looking actual growth rate of earnings (measured as change in earnings-per-share from 
time t to t+1 scaled by share price). We expect negative relation with debt maturity as higher 
growth implies more favorable information and firm should opt for shorter-term debts to take 
advantage of the lower cost in refinancing (Flannery 1986; Diamond 1991b; 1993). Market 
Access, a dummy variable equal to one (zero otherwise) for firms with public debt ratings, is 
included in both leverage and debt maturity equations. Faulkender and Peterson (2006) show a 
firm’s access to the public debt market allows it with more flexibility to adjust their capital 
structure, so it can obtain higher leverage and debts with longer maturity (hence we expect 
positive coefficients). We include Asset Maturity, which is the weighted asset maturity based on 
current assets divided by operating expenses (Barclays et al. 2003), as a determinant of debt 
maturity because firms have a tendency to match their assets with liabilities on their term 
structures. Hence, we expect positive coefficient for this maturity matching effect. Giambona et 
al. (2008) and Nagano (2010) argue that asset liquidity is an important determinant for debt 
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financing decision. Hence, we also include Asset Liquidity, measured as an ordinal scale of 1 to 5 
based on the property type investment of the REIT.7 However, we offer no directional prediction 
as more liquid assets could either lower the needs of debt financing or raise the ability of firms to 
raise funds. Finally, Firm Age is measured by time (in years) since public listing of the firms. As 
mature firms have lower financing needs (Faulkender and Peterson 2006), negative relationship 
could exist between firm age and leverage. Alternatively, mature firms are better able to obtain 
debt financing and firm age can be positively related to both leverage and debt maturity. Thus 
firm age can be positively or negatively related to the debt financing variables. In our empirical 
analysis, we also include year and country dummies to control for macroeconomic time effect 
and institutional differences across the three countries.  
 
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our sample includes 81 equity REITs from Australia (22), Japan (33) and Singapore (26) 
over the sample period of 2005-2011 from the SNL Database. These equity REITs can be 
classified into seven major property types: retail, office, multi-family, industrial, hotel, 
healthcare and diversified. We choose 2005 as the first year because the markets of J-REITs and 
S-REITs grow substantially only since 2005 (FDSC 2013). In total, there are 386 firm-year 
observations. We eliminate 135 observations due to missing data on leverage and other firm and 
                                                            
7  The scale is ordered from the most liquid to the least liquid REIT property types: 1. Retail and office; 2. 
Diversified; 3. Industrial; 4. Hotels and Multifamily; 5. Healthcare. The appropriate measure of Asset Liquidity 
would be the average maturity of the outstanding leases, with longer average maturity indicating higher asset 
liquidity values. However, we were unable to obtain this data for all the markets. Based on practical experience, we 
believe the level of investment activity in the various property types reflects the liquidity in a particular asset class.  
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financial variables. We eliminate another 90 observations with missing information on debt 
maturity. Our final sample comprises 161 firm-year observations.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis. Our 
dependent variables Leverage and Debt Maturity report means of 0.38 and 2.82 respectively. The 
key variables of interest, Sponsor and External Management, have means of 0.53 and 0.88 
respectively. Consistent with expectation, the sponsor structure is quite common among the 
Asian-Pacific REIT markets and most of these REITs are essentially still externally managed. 
Table 1 also reports summary statistics of the control variables. On average, our sample firms 
have a market-to-book ratio of 0.92 and they seem to be relatively young firms with an average 
age of 4.49 years. 
In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics comparing the means of variables for firms 
with and without sponsor and for firms adopting external versus internal management structure. 
Firms with sponsors seem to have much higher levels of leverage than firms without sponsor 
(mean of 0.43 versus 0.34, difference statistically significant at 1%). Moreover, firms that are 
externally managed report much lower levels of leverage (mean of 0.36) than internally managed 
firms (mean of 0.50, difference statistically significant at 1%). However, we do not observe any 
significant differences across the subsample groups in terms of debt maturity. Of the control 
variables, we find that firms with sponsor are significantly smaller, more profitable, and with 
higher asset liquidity. We also find firms with external management are larger, more profitable 
but with lower earnings growth. These firms also have better access to market and lower asset 
maturity. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our main empirical results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows regression 
results of the impact of sponsor and external management on leverage. Given the concern of 
possible correlations between observations across firms in the same country, as well as time-
specific effect (for instance, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers occurred in 2008 may impact 
the global capital market and hence the financing of REITs), we adopt the Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) regressions in the empirical analysis.8 The first two columns in Table 3 show 
results of the GLS regressions. The first column shows results of regressing Leverage on 
Sponsor and External Management. We find that Leverage is positively related to Sponsor and 
negatively related to External Management (both statistically significant at the 1% levels). It is 
true when the country fixed effect is taken into account. The findings confirm our notion that 
sponsor has a positive impact on debt financing for the Asian-Pacific REITs. With the presence 
of sponsor, banks are more willing to extend credit to these REITs. It could be due to sponsor 
serving a monitoring and governance role in the company, increasing the confidence of creditors 
lending to these firms. It could also be that sponsor may possibly bail out the REIT in trouble, 
lowering the risks of nonpayment from the perspective of creditors. The findings also reinforce 
the negative relationship between external management and leverage, indicating externally 
(internally) managed firms are less (more) likely to obtain debt financing. External REIT 
managers could be less devoted in securing the cheapest way of debt financing for the REITs and 
may opt for equity financing instead. Moreover, the lenders, fully realizing the principal-agent 
conflicts in externally-managed REITs, could become more concerned extending credit to these 
                                                            
8  Hsiao (2009), Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (2008), among others, show that through a specially designed data-
transformation, it is possible to obtain unbiased estimates in a panel data set with both (cross-sectional) firm-level 
fixed effect and (inter-temporal) time-specific effect with GLS. For an application of this method in the real estate 
literature, see Dong et al. (2012), among others. 
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firms. Table 3, second column, presents the empirical results of the full model with the control 
variables. We find that leverage tends to be negatively related to profitability and asset liquidity, 
and positively related to cash flow volatility,9 market access and firm age.  We continue to find 
significant positive coefficient for Sponsor and significant negative coefficient for External 
Management.  
Alcock et al. (2014) show that leverage and debt maturity are joint financing decisions 
for U.S. listed real estate firms. Hence, leverage and debt maturity could be simultaneously 
determined. Consequently, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach to examine the 
impact of sponsor and external management on these financing decisions. In our first stages, we 
regress leverage and debt maturity on the explanatory variables using specification (1) and (2) 
respectively. The residuals of these first-stage regressions are presumed to be orthogonal to the 
other factors and they serve as the instrumental variables in the second-stage regressions. In 
other words, we use the residuals of the first-stage leverage (debt maturity) regressions as 
instruments for the debt maturity (leverage) in the second-stage regressions.  
We present the findings of the impact of sponsor and external management on leverage 
under the instrumental variable (IV) approach in the third to fourth columns in Table 3. We find 
our main results remain intact, that is, sponsor continues to positively influence leverage and 
external management continues to negatively influence leverage. Though we find leverage and 
debt maturity are negatively related in column three, the correlation becomes insignificant once 
we include the set of control variables in the fourth columns.  
                                                            
9 We note our findings are in contrast to prior findings such as Bradley et al. (1984). We believe a possible 
explanation can be attributed to the trade-off theory (Hart 1993), which posits when undertaking unprofitable new 
investment projects poses greater threat to the firms’ value than inefficient liquidation, optimal leverage will 
increase with cash flow volatility. In particular, the Asian-Pacific REIT markets are characterized by primarily 
borrowing from the bank loan market, which are shown to have low threat of inefficient liquidation (Berlin and 
Loeys 1988).  
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We now focus on the impact of sponsor and external management on debt maturity. 
Table 4, columns one to two, report the results of the GLS regressions. We find significant 
positive coefficients for Sponsor, indicating with the presence of sponsor, REIT firms are able to 
obtain loans with longer term to maturity. We also find significant negative coefficient for 
External Management in column two, implying that externally managed REITs fail to negotiate 
for longer-term loans. Of the control variables, we find debt maturity is positively related to the 
Market-to-Book ratio and Market Access, and negatively related to Asset Liquidity. In the third to 
fourth columns, we report the results under the instrumental variable (IV) approach. We continue 
to find the positive impact of Sponsor and the negative impact of External Management on debt 
maturity. Interestingly, Leverage is also a significant determinant of debt maturity in columns 
four. The results suggest that, though leverage and debt maturity appear to be joint financing 
decisions, the decision of debt maturity is more dependent on the level of firm leverage than vice 
versa. And again, we allow for country fixed effects and they turn out to be statistically 
insignificant. 
The Impact of Financial Crisis 
The recent global financial crisis has had a huge impact on financial, especially real 
estate, markets around the world. Though one can argue the real estate markets in Asia were less 
hit, Kim (2009) shows that linkages between the U.S. and Australia REIT sectors are strong and 
Liow (2012) shows REIT sectors among countries in the Asia-Pacific regions are relatively co-
integrated. Moreover, Claessens and Fan (2002) show that corporate governance is typically 
weak in Asia as conventional corporate governance mechanisms have limited effectiveness in 
Asian countries with weak institutions and poor property rights. We therefore conjecture bank 
lenders would be less likely to extend loans to Asian-Pacific REITs subsequent to the financial 
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crisis. In particular, lenders would be more concerned with REITs that are non-sponsored and 
externally managed since these firms signify weaker governance and higher principal-agent 
conflicts. We focus on the post-crisis period instead of the crisis period because while the Asian-
Pacific REIT markets were less affected during the crisis, the lending practices of the Asian 
banks may change after the crisis.10 In fact, it is evident that the financial crisis has led to a huge 
wave of financial reforms at banks around the world only after the crisis.11  We empirically 
investigate the effect of the global financial crisis on the relationship between sponsor and 
external management with debt financing decisions by augmenting the specifications (1) and (2) 
with the introduction of a Post Financial Crisis (PFC) variable and the interaction terms of Post 
Financial Crisis with Sponsor and External Management.12 Following Devos et al. (2013), we 
define the financial crisis from the beginning of 2007 to the beginning of 2009, and thus our PFC 
variables is equal to one if the observation lies in the period of 2009-2011, zero otherwise.  
Results presented in Table 5 shows the relationship of leverage and Sponsor and External 
Management. GLS results in the first two columns show that Sponsor continues to exert a 
positive impact on leverage over the sample period, although the effect is weaker than before. 
Yet, the interaction term of PFC and Sponsor is surprisingly negative and significant in column 
two. We interpret the results as follows. Devos et al. (2013) show that during the crisis, 
institutional owners have fled the U.S. REIT market despite that they are supposed to serve the 
monitoring role for these firms. Hence, Asian banks might have similar concerns with these 
                                                            
10 There is growing empirical evidence for changes in bank lending practices, including Kwan (2010) for the U.S. 
banks, Fraser (2012) for the Banks in U.K., Solheim and Vatne (2014) for the banks in Norway.  
11 In unreported analysis, we also investigate the effect of the financial crisis by analyzing the impact on debt 
financing decisions during the financial crisis instead of post crisis. We find the relationships of debt financing and 
Sponsor and External Management remain unaffected in the crisis period, confirming with our conjecture that debt 
financing decisions have been altered for the Asian-Pacific REITs only after the crisis. See also James et al. (2014) 
and the reference therein for more discussion on this topic. 
12 We do not include year dummies in the regressions because of the correlated nature between our crisis variable 
and the year dummies. 
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sponsors with Asian-Pacific REITs, and thereby constraining the lending practices to sponsored 
REITs accordingly subsequent to the crisis. The GLS results also show that the main effect of 
External Management is no longer significant but the interaction term between PFC and 
External Management is highly significant at the 1% levels, indicating externally managed 
REITs have substantially lower leverage mostly in the post-crisis period. As expected, we find 
that the financial crisis variable PFC has negative coefficients on leverage. Moreover, the 
country fixed effect of Australia is consistently negative (relative to Japan).13 This result may be 
related to the fact that in the post-crisis period, major central banks adopt unconventional 
monetary policies, which leads to a significant increase in commodity prices. As a commodity-
exporting country, Australia authorities respond by adjusting monetary policies and macro-
prudential policies, which have consequences on the real estate markets and the leverage of 
REITs.14 The third to fourth columns of Table 5 show similar findings under the Instrumental 
Variable (IV) approach. 
The country fixed effect for Singapore (relative to Japan) is also significant but the story 
may be different. Notice that while Australia practices inflation-targeting type monetary policy, 
Singapore adopts an exchange rate anchor type policy, which leads Singapore’s responses to 
crisis different from Australia.15 And according to Doraisami (2011), the GDP of Singapore 
contracted by more than 6% in the first half of 2009 and exports fell by more than 20% in the 
first quarter of 2009. Singapore government responded with a fiscal stimulation package, which 
                                                            
13 In contrast, the positivity of country fixed effect of Singapore vanishes, once we control for other variables, such 
as Cash Flow Volatility and Market Access.  
14 Among others, see Reserve Bank of Australia (2012), Ellis (2013), Leung et al. (2013), Shi et al. (2014) for 
related discussion. 
15 Among others, see Monetary Authority of Singapore (2013), Shirai (2014) and the reference therein for more 
related discussion. 
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amounted to about 8% of GDP at the time. Thus, the negative fixed-effect may be the result of 
the “contraction effect” of the global financial crisis.16  
Lastly, Table 6 reports results which we examine the relationship between debt maturity 
and Sponsor and External Management in light of the financial crisis. We find that the results 
here are somehow different from those on leverage. In particular, the interaction terms of PFC 
and Sponsor are no longer important. Instead, the interaction terms of PFC and External 
Management significantly affect debt maturity. Thus, Table 5 seems to suggest that Sponsor and 
External Management do affect how much a REIT can borrow. Table 6, at the same time, 
suggests that conditioning on the amount a REIT can borrow, Sponsor may not but External 
Management may play a role on how long that REIT can borrow. Column two also indicates that 
the Market-to-Book ratio, and Cash Flow Volatility affect the debt maturity. Country fixed 
effects do not matter. Column three and four report the results under the Instrumental Variable 
(IV) approach, which are  similar.  
 In unreported robustness tests, we also reexamine the relationship between debt 
financing and Sponsor and External Management with different measures of the dependent 
variables. We measure leverage alternatively by market leverage, measured as total book debt 
divided by (total assets minus book equity plus market equity). We alternatively measure debt 
maturity as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Of the control variables, we include different 
combinations of the explanatory variables as controls in specification (1) and (2). Our findings 
remain qualitatively unchanged with these alternative model specifications and measures.   
 
                                                            
16 See also Obstfeld (2014), among others, which provides a detailed analysis of the limited effect of government 
policies in emerging market economies in the face of global financial crises. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Debt financing decisions are some of the most important for REITs given the lack of 
internal cash flows and high dividend distributions. In this study, we specifically highlight the 
distinctive and unique characteristics of Asian-Pacific REITs, namely sponsorship and external 
management. We show that the presence of a sponsor enables REITs to engage in more 
aggressive debt financing practices with higher leverage and loans with longer maturity. We also 
show externally managed REITs to be less competitive in the debt market, as evident with lower 
leverage and loans with shorter maturity. Other things being equal, we find that lenders have 
become more cautious about REIT borrowing subsequent to the financial crisis and that the 
existence of a sponsor becomes less effective at helping REITs to secure debt financing . 
Leverage is also substantially lower for externally managed REIT in the post crisis period. Thus, 
it may be more difficult to channel capital into the Asian-Pacific REIT markets. As the degree of 
urbanization in Asian-Pacific region has yet caught up with the Western countries, there is an 
expectation that the development of REIT markets could enhance the urbanization process and 
economic development.17 Our study suggests that the financial crisis could have a negative effect 
on the development of the REIT markets in the region. Clearly, this is an important topic and 
more research efforts are needed.  
Future research should explore how the global financial crisis might have changed the 
financing and capital structure of Asian firms. The current study focuses on REITs, which are 
required to distribute most of the profit in the form of dividend in many countries. For general 
stocks, this requirement is absent and hence firms could adjust in the margin of dividend 
distribution. Banks can also reallocate the loans to different types of firms after the global 
                                                            
17 Among others, see Packer et al. (2013), Malpezzi (2012) for related discussion. 
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financial crisis; especially many financial reforms have taken place. In addition, the global 
financial crisis also leads major central banks to adopt unconventional monetary policies at least 
for a few years. Those policies can have important consequences to different asset markets.18 The 
resulting equilibrium would be interesting to explore.    
                                                            
18 Clearly, the literature is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see Leung and Tang (2012), Leung et al. 
(2013), Roache and Rousset (2013), Rogers et al. (2014). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q25 Median Q75 
Dependent Variables 
Leverage 0.38 0.13 0.30 0.37 0.46 
Debt Maturity 2.82 0.75 2.52 2.99 3.46 
Asia-Pacific Specific Factors 
Sponsor 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
External Management 0.88 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Firm & Financial Variables 
Market-to-Book 0.92 0.22 0.75 0.88 1.07 
Firm Size 21.18 0.71 20.68 21.17 21.58 
Profitability (ROA) 3.74 5.02 1.92 3.08 6.83 
Cash Flow Volatility 2.88 8.88 0.01 0.02 14.12 
Earnings Growth 0.05 0.17 -0.01 0.01 0.05 
Market Access 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Asset Maturity 2.15 1.55 0.94 1.82 2.56 
Asset Liquidity 2.55 1.10 2.00 2.00 3.00 
Firm Age (Years) 4.49 1.97 2.96 4.29 5.64 
No. of 
Observations 
161 
This table presents the summary statistics of the total sample. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics with Sponsor and External Management 
Variable  Sponsor Without 
Sponsor 
t-test 
difference 
Internal 
Management 
External 
Management 
t-test 
difference 
Dependent Variables 
Leverage 0.43 0.34 4.70*** 0.50 0.36 4.56*** 
Debt Maturity 2.84 2.79 0.42 2.96 2.80 1.06 
Firm & Financial Variables 
Market-to-Book 0.91 0.94 -0.87 0.85 0.93 -1.57 
Firm Size 21.07 21.30 -2.05** 20.73 21.24 -3.00*** 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
5.10 2.22 3.79*** 1.50 4.04 -2.09** 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
 
2.68 
 
1.99 
 
1.21 
 
1.85 
 
1.75 
 
0.50 
Earnings Growth 0.04 0.06 -0.73 0.20 0.03 4.19*** 
Market Access 0.60 0.59 0.10 0.37 0.63 -2.17** 
Asset Maturity 2.32 1.97 1.41 3.98 1.91 6.02*** 
Asset Liquidity 2.85 2.19 3.98*** 2.47 2.55 -0.31 
Firm Age (Years) 4.47 4.50 -0.10 4.55 4.48 0.14 
No. of 
Observations 
 
85 
 
76 
  
19 
 
142 
 
This table shows summary statistics of the subsample groups with and without sponsor, and internal 
versus external management. *** 1% significance; ** 5% significance.  
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Table 3: The Impact of Sponsor and External Management on Leverage (GLS and IV Approach) 
Variable Dependent variable: leverage 
 GLS Instrumental Variable Approach 
Constant -0.04*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.24) 
Sponsor 1.17*** 1.02*** 1.07*** 1.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
External Management -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.64*** -0.91*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Debt Maturity   -0.01*** -0.01 
   (0.00) (0.17) 
Market-to-Book  -0.01 0.01 
  (0.95) (0.43) 
Firm Size  0.02 0.02 
  (0.33) (0.30) 
Profitability(ROA)  -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Cash Flow Volatility  0.01** 0.01** 
  (0.02) (0.01) 
Market Access  1.78*** 1.93*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Asset Liquidity  -0.92*** -0.98*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm Age  0.01** 0.01** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Australia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.56) (0.62) (0.46) (0.61) 
Singapore -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.00) (0.76) (0.24) (0.78) 
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Year yes yes yes yes 
Wald chi2 68.12*** 65071.81*** 180.50*** 206.07*** 
 This table presents regression results on the total sample of 161 observations. *** 1% 
significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance. 
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Table 4: The Impact of Sponsor and External Management on Debt Maturity (GLS and IV Approach) 
Variable                                                      Dependent variable: debt maturity 
 GLS Instrumental Variable Approach 
Constant -0.19*** -0.01 -0.18*** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.87) 
Sponsor 0.93*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
External Management -0.19 -0.99*** -0.37 -0.89*** 
 (0.82) (0.00) (0.69) (0.00) 
Leverage   -0.45 -0.57** 
   (0.11) (0.04) 
Market-to-Book  0.35*** 0.38*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Size  0.21 -0.31 
  (0.93) (0.89) 
Size square  -0.01 0.01 
  (0.96) (0.88) 
Cash Flow Volatility  0.01 0.01 
  (0.46) (0.50) 
Earnings Growth  -0.07 -0.12 
  (0.51) (0.21) 
Market Access  1.06*** 1.00*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Asset Maturity  0.01 0.01 
  (0.50) (0.31) 
Asset Liquidity  -0.62*** -0.59*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm Age  -0.01 0.01 
  (0.82) (0.63) 
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Australia -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.58) (0.65) (0.59) (0.66) 
Singapore -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.24) (0.50) (0.24) (0.40) 
Year  yes yes yes yes 
Wald chi2 69.10*** 162.90*** 71.23*** 192.07*** 
This table presents regression results on the total sample of 161 observations. *** 1% 
significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Sponsor and External Management on Leverage Subsequent to Financial Crisis 
(GLS and Instrumental Variable Approach) 
Variable Dependent variable:  leverage 
 GLS Instrumental Variable Approach 
Constant -0.01 0.05*** -0.01  0.04*** 
 (0.98) (0.00) (0.73)  (0.01) 
Sponsor 0.26* 0.80* 0.26*  0.71* 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.09) 
External Management -0.05 -0.06 -0.01  -0.07 
 (0.47) (0.70) (0.94)  (0.67) 
Post Financial Crisis (PFC) -0.08*** -0.01 -0.08***  -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.96) (0.00)  (0.04) 
PFC*Sponsor -0.02 -0.01** -0.02***  -0.02*** 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.00)  (0.00) 
PFC*External Management -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08***  -0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Debt Maturity   -0.01***  -0.01** 
   (0.00)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book  0.01   0.01 
  (0.72)   (0.74) 
Size  0.02   0.01 
  (0.33)   (0.89) 
Profitability(ROA)  -0.01   -0.01** 
  (0.10)   (0.04) 
Cash Flow Volatility  0.01***   0.01*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
Market Access  0.92***   0.71** 
  (0.00)   (0.03) 
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Asset Liquidity  -0.37*   -0.28 
  (0.06)   (0.17) 
Firm Age  0.01   0.01* 
  (0.19)   (0.10) 
Australia -0.03* -0.04** -0.03*  -0.03** 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.09)  (0.04) 
Singapore 0.01*** 0.01 0.01***  0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.42) (0.00)  (0.02) 
Wald chi2 42.38*** 65.20*** 56.67***  105.68*** 
This table presents regression results on the total sample of 161 observations. *** 1% 
significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance. 
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Table 6: The Impact of Sponsor and External Management on Debt Maturity Subsequent to the Financial 
Crisis (GLS and Instrumental Variable Approach) 
Variable Dependent variable: debt maturity 
 GLS Instrumental Variable Approach 
Constant 0.03 0.29*** 0.02  0.28*** 
 (0.39) (0.00) (0.50)  (0.00) 
Sponsor 0.12 0.69*** 0.07  0.63*** 
 (0.83) (0.00) (0.90)  (0.00) 
External Management -0.78 -0.79*** -0.60***  -0.64 
 (0.17) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.25) 
Post Financial Crisis (PFC) -0.17*** -0.64*** -0.12*  -0.61*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.07)  (0.00) 
PFC*Sponsor -0.01 -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 
 (0.80) (0.38) (0.38)  (0.29) 
PFC*External management 0.16*** 0.17* 0.12**  0.16* 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.07) 
Leverage   -0.96***  -0.71** 
   (0.00)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book  0.42***   0.40*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
Size  -0.26   -0.70 
  (0.92)   (0.76) 
Size square  0.01   0.02 
  (0.88)   (0.74) 
Cash Flow Volatility  0.04***   0.04*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
Earnings Growth  -0.13   -0.14 
  (0.27)   (0.22) 
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Market Access  -0.65   -0.10 
  (0.68)   (0.95) 
Asset Maturity  0.02   0.01 
  (0.26)   (0.48) 
Asset Liquidity  1.18   0.74 
  (0.22)   (0.42) 
Firm Age  0.02   0.03** 
  (0.13)   (0.03) 
Australia 0.06 0.08 0.05  0.09 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.25)  (0.15) 
Singapore -0.03 -0.01 -0.02  -0.01 
 (0.23) (0.63) (0.57)  (0.68) 
Wald chi2 20.78*** 333.99*** 36.22***  377.88*** 
This table presents regression results on the total sample of 161 observations. *** 1% 
significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance. 
 
 
 
 
